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The credit crunch and economic crisis have demonstrated the need to properly understand, characterize and assimilate risk in business activities. Failure 
10 do this has resulted in serious consequences to the users involved. So the analysis and management of risk is one of the important pre·requisites to 
ensure a successful outcome in a business activity in any domain. In this paper we propose an approach by which an interaction initiating user in the 
domain of e·business ascertains beforehand the level of transactional risk in the successful completion of its business activity and utilizes it to determine on 
an interaction. The proposed model considers the different sub·categories and characteristics of transactional risk and ascertains in numeric and semantic 
terms the different levels and severities of its occurrence. It then utilizes the determined analysis of transactional risk to recommend on an informed 
int!;'raction·based decision to the interaction initiating user. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Electronic business is rapidly becoming the preferred way of 
achieving outcomes in the growing technological world. Users 
all around the world are adopting this medium for carrying out 
their business activities. In return they get to complete their tasks 
in shorter periods of time, with increased flexibility and capabil­
ity. An e-business architecture can be utilized to facilitate any 
type ofbusiness activity under its broad domain, the most popular 
being the e-marketplace where users collaborate with each other 
to achieve their desired outcomes. But like its predecessors, this 
architecture too does not provide any guarantee ofalways having 
a successful outcome. Users may also experience a negative 
situation, which signifies the non-achievement of their outcomes 
and the resultant consequences. So in order to enjoy the benefits 
ofe·business paradigm users have to make informed interaction­
based decisions. We define informed interaction-based decisions 
as those in which the user's interaction experience and benefits 
are maximized and any losses are minimized or alleviated. By 
making such decisions users can transform themselves into in­
telligent agents who can then act in a proactive way towards 
achieving their goals. To make an informed decision the notions 
of Security, Privacy, Trust and Risk play an important part. In 
the literature various approaches of decision-making have been 
proposed in the area ofe-business. But most of those approaches 
ignore the notion ofrisk while doing so. In other words, they con· 
sider the notion of risk as a subset of trust, security and privacy; 
and consider that its impact in an e-business interaction can be 
alleviated or mitigated by the analysis of those concepts. But in 
reality this is not the case. Risk captures the 'negative' concepts 
that could be possible in an interaction and represents both the 
likelihood of failure as well as the consequences of failure of the 
interaction. This notion of risk will then provide a clear basis of 
decision making. Let us consider the simple example of a user 
engaging in an e-business interaction with another user, where 
there is a 20% chance of failure that would result in a loss of$IO. 
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One might quite possihly engage in sueh an interaction. If on the 
other hand, the loss from such an interaction was $200,000, one 
would prohahly not engage at a 201ff failure rate hut would re­
quire a much lower failure rate say 0.0 IIff, hefore heing prepared 
to engage in such an interaction. This simple example illustrates 
that it is not just the prohahility of failure alone hut the prohahil ­
ity of failure taken together with the consequences that guides 
the decision to participate in an interaction. Such representation 
is characterized hy the notion of risk and is not determi ned hy the 
analysis of trust, security or privacy in the collahoration. So risk 
is one of the important concepts to analyze and consider while 
decision-making. 
In this paper we propose a framework which quantities and 
considers risk while decision-making in an e-husiness interac­
tion. The proposed framework can he applied in any interaction 
in that domain where the financial resources are at stake. The 
paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we hriefly discuss the 
existing approaches from the literature and highlight the impor­
tance of considering risk while decision-making in e-husiness. 
In Section 3 we discuss our previous work of determining the 
suh-categories of risk for its assessment in the husiness interac­
tion. In Section 4 and 5 we consider the determination of the 
numerical and linguistic level of transactional risk in an interac­
tion. In Section 6 we propose a risk hased recommender systelll 
in e-husiness interaction. 
2. 	 IMPORTANCE OF TRANSACTIONAL 
RISK WHILE DECISION·MAKING 
Decision Making is a mental process that warrants a user to de­
cide on its future course from the possihle availahle ones. It 
is a prohlem solving approach hased on the psychological and 
cognitive factors of the user, and requires it to analyze all the 
different availahle options against a set of indicators or needs 
and then hase its decision on choosing the hest among them. An 
e-husiness interaction is carried out for achieving a set of desired 
outcomes, so the decision-making process in such interactions 
should he hased on maximizing the successful achievement of 
the desired outcomes. The main ohjective for the interaction 
initiating user during the decision-making process should he to 
decide whether it will achieve its desired outcomes and maxi­
mum henefits in interacting with that user. If it has to choose 
from a group, then during decision-making that particular user 
should he chosen with whom its interaction experience and hen­
efits will he maximized. In such scenarios, security will help 
to determine and keep the collahoration platform safe from the 
intrusion of the outside disruptive forces. The notion of privacy 
will help to determine and keep the sensitive information of each 
user safe from un-authorized access. Trust will express the level 
ofdependahility of the interacting user on another user to achieve 
its outcomes. The notion of risk will express the consequences to 
the user as a result of failure of its collahoration. Although each 
of these concepts are related to the same husiness interaction, the 
analysis they provide is different and important at different tillle 
periods of the collahoration for making an informed interaction­
hased decision. The notion of security and privacy are important 
in the initial part of making an informed interaction-hascd dcci­
sion, whcrc the interacting lIser from a group selects those users 
to collahorate with who satisfy its perceptions of interacting in 
a safe environment. But such analysis is not enough on its own 
to make an informed interaction-hased decision. To have a com­
plete analysis, from the selected group that user should he chosen 
who has the hest capahility to commit to the desired outcomes of 
the husiness interaction. This representation is achieved hy the 
comhined analysis of trust and risk in the husiness interaction. 
The term risk in the previous sentence refers to a specific type 
of it. 
There are different representations that are achieved hy the 
analysis of risk according to the ohject of analysis in a husiness 
interaction. For example, the non-presence of the security mech­
anisms poses a risk to the successful completion of the husiness 
interaction. Similarly, the non-preservement of private informa­
tion of the participants represents a threat. These types of risks 
are different from each other and can he classitied into different 
categories, namely security risks and privacy risks respectively: 
and will he addressed hy the analysis of concepts like security 
and privacy respectively. These types of risks are related to the 
initial considerations of decision-making in a husiness interac­
tion. But another important representation of risk is required 
in the later part of decision-making. This type of risk gives an 
assesslllent of the level to which the interacting user will not 
achieve its desired outcomes in the husiness interaction and the 
level of consequences that it will experience as a result of that. 
This is due to the failure of the other user in committing to what 
was expected from it. That representation of risk is termed as the 
transactional risk: and it plays an important part during the later 
part of decision-making. In this paper hy using the term risk we 
refer to the transactional risk. Although the importance of trans­
actional risk while decision-making has heen acknowledged hy 
some researchers, they ignore it in lieu for trust while decision­
making. In other words, they consider trust to he an authorativc 
concept as compared to risk and hase their decision on that. For 
example, Aherer et al. [I] consider the possihility of agent 'A' 
cheating in the interaction, hut they do not take into consideration 
the transactional risk while decision making, which gives the de­
gree and magnitude of loss in interacting with agent 'A' due to its 
cheating. Zheng et al. [2] consider the cost and utility function 
associated with an interaction while decision making, hut they 
associate the cost with the 'rewards' of the consequences of the 
decision. They do not consider the notion of loss associated with 
the uncertainty in the interaction and the consequences of deci­
sion. Josang et al. [3] consider trust as the only factor in their 
approach which motivates an agent in the interaction. Although 
they consider the 'possihle harm' and 'negative consequences'. 
they do not quantify it in their model. Hassell [4] proposes a 
method wherehy an agent decides to trust another agent hy con­
sidering the neurological and socialization characteristics of its 
hrain apart from just considering the 'level of helief' expressed 
hy trust, hut they fail to consider the importance of transactional 
risk and its impact on an agent's hrain while decision making. 
Pearson et al. l5] proposes an approach of making trust-hased 
decision which omits taking transactional risk into considera­
tion. Wang and Lin [6] state that trust represents the extent to 
which a party can depend on the other with relative assurance, 
even though 'negative consequences' are possihle. BlIt they do 
not propose an approach hy which the negative consequences 
are quantified and considered while decision making. Further in 
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[7]. Wang and Lin propose an approach that differentiatcs trans­
action pricc of the interaction during trust evaluation. But this 
determination tlocs not represent the level anti tlegree of loss 
that can he expcriencetl. Measuring the loss or its impact in 
the interaction is within the scope of transactional risk analysis. 
and hence it shoultl he consitleretl when making an informetl 
interaclion-hasetl tlecision. To this effect. approaches have heen 
proposed in the literature which assess risk in an interaction 18­
17J. hut none of them do it hy taking into consideration its re­
quired suh-categories and characteristics. So any framcwork of 
decision-making on such level of transactional risk docs not give 
the required analysis to make an informed interaction-hased de­
cision. As mentioned in the previous section. transactional risk 
captures (a) the prohahility of failure of the interaction and (h) 
the consequences of failure of the interaction to the interacting 
user. So during its analysis it should he assessed according to 
these suh-categories. Further the characteristics of transactional 
risk that need to he considered while analysing these suhcale­
gories arc its context specific. assessment criteria specific and 
time specific characteristics. Context specific nature takes into 
consideration the purpose for which the interaction is heing car­
ried out. Assessment Criteria specillc takes into consideration 
the specific outcomes in the particular context anti time spe­
cillc characteristics take into consideration the dynamic nature 
of risk. In our previous work. we had proposed approaches hy 
which each suh-category of transactional risk is determined. We 
will give a hrief overview of those approaches in the next sel.> 
tion. In this article. hased on that analysis we will propose an 
approach wherehy the user can analyse and quantify the level 
of transactional risk in an e-husiness interaction. We will then 
utilize the determined levcl of transactional risk to determine on 
an interaction. 
3. 	 ASSESSMENT OF THE SUB-CATEGO­
RIES OF TRANSACTIONAL RISK IN 
E-BUSINESS INTERACTIONS 
We term the two intcracting users of the e-husincss interaction 
as the risk assessing agent and the risk assessed agent. Risk 
assessing agent is that user who wants to achieve the expecta­
tions and looks for a uscI' to interact with. Risk assessed agent 
is that user who has the capahility to provide the risk assessing 
agent with its expectations. Expectations arc the collection or 
all the desired outcomes which the risk assessing agent wants to 
achieve in its interaction. We consider that hefore the interac­
tion. the interacting agents negotiate with each other anti decide 
on the common tlesired outcomes to he achieved. which arc then 
termed as the expectations of the interaction. Performance risk 
represents the level 10 which the risk assessing agent will not 
achieve its expectations in forming an interaction with the risk 
assessing agent. In other words. it represents the incapahility of 
the risk assessed agent in providing the risk assessing agent with 
ils desired outcomes according to the formed assessment critc­
ria. It is quite possible that the risk assessing agent's in\eraction 
with the risk assessed agent is in a point of lime in the future. 
In such scenarios. it has to rely on thc risk assessed agent's pre­
vious reputation in the assessment criteria of the expectations 
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to determine its per/()rmance risk in the actual time period of 
its interaction. To achieve that we divide the time period of 
the interaction into two parts. namely pre-interaction start time 
phase and post-interaction start time phase. Pre-Interaction start 
time phase refers to the period of time hcfore the risk assessing 
agent starts its interaction with the risk assessetl agent. whereas 
Post-Interaction start time phase is that period of time, after the 
risk assessing agent starts and interacts with the risk assessed 
agent. To determine the perf(mnance risk. we proposed the Fail­
ure Scale and the FailureLevel. The Failure Scale. on the scale 
of 0-100% represents the different levels of failure that could 
he possihle in an interaction. FailureLevei groups the different 
levels of failure on the Failure Scale according to their severity 
with a numerical value. To consider the dynamic nature of trans­
actional risk, we consider that the risk assessing agent divides 
the time period of its interaction with the risk assessed agent 
(termed as the time space) in different non-overlapping 'time 
slots' and determine the FailureLevel of the risk assessed agent 
in each assessment criterion in each time slot, either hy its past 
interaction history or soliciting recommendations. It then com, 
hines the FailureLevei of each assessment criterion according 
to its signifkance to determine the risk assessed agent's perfor­
mance risk in that time slot. Once the performance risk in the 
pre-interaction start time slots has heen determined. then the risk 
assessing agent can utilize it to determine the different levels of 
performance risk in each of the post-interw..:tion start time slots. 
Utilizing that. the FailureLevel Curve (FLC) of the husiness in­
teraction is plotted. The FailureLevel Curve as shown in Figure I 
quantifies and represents the different levels of performance risk 
of the risk assessed agent in committing to the expectations of its 
interaction. The detailed methodology hy which the risk assess­
ing agent determines the performance risk of the risk assessed 
agent according to its expectations in explained in Hussain et al. 
[18]. 
In an e-husiness interaction we consider that the risk assessed 
agent interacts with the risk assessing agent to give its desired 
outcomes in exchange of the pre-decided monetary financial 
value. These financial resources are decided het ween the in­
leracting users while forming the expectations. So the impact or 
consequences to the risk assessing agent as a result of not achiev­
ing its desired outcomes is in those financial resources; and is 
determined hy ascertaining the financial risk 10 it in its husiness 
interaction. The level of financial risk depends on two factors 
which arc (a) the accurate investments which the risk assessing 
agent will have at stake in an interaction and (h) the variahility 
to which it will invest its resources. To caplure these factors 
we propose that the risk assessing agent determines the Amount 
Invested Curve (AIC). The Amount Invested Curve takes into 
consideration the different levels of investments in the time sIms 
of the interaction and determines the accurate prohahility of an 
amount at stake throughout the interaction time period. Ac­
cording to the expectations. the risk assessing agent expects to 
achieve its desired outcomes in Ihese resources. But due to the 
performance risk of the risk assessed agent and mher uncertain­
ties (non-dependant events) this might not he possihle and the 
risk assessing agent may not achieve its expectations in Ihe re­
sources as decided in the expectations. To determine their dTeet. 
we propose that the risk assessing agent determines the Actual 
Factual Amount Invested Curve (AFAIC) of its husiness inter­
action. The AFAIC captures those uncertainties and represents 
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the actual resources with their probability that the risk assess­
ing agent needs to keep at stake in the interaction as shown in 
Figure 2. Based on its maximum investment capacity (MIC), it 
can ascertain the 'Loss of Investment Probability' (LOIP) and 
the 'Possible Consequences of Failure' (PCF) to it in the inter­
action. Maximum investment capacity is that financial amount 
which was decided in the expectations. The 'Loss of Investment 
Probability' (LOIP) of the interaction gives the probability of 
the risk assessing agent not achieving the full benefit of its re­
sources that it invests while interacting with a risk assessed agent 
as decided in the expectations. The 'Possible Consequences of 
Failure' (PCF) in a business interaction represents the additional 
degree/s of resources needed to be kept at stake in the interaction 
from what was decided in the expectations. The combination of 
these outcomes rcpresents the financial risk in the interaction. 
The detailed methodology by which the risk assessing agent de­
termines the financial risk to it in forming an interaction with the 
risk assessed agent is explained in Hussain et al. [19J and [20J. 
Once the sub-categories of transactional risk have been de­
termined, they should be combined for ascertaining the level of 
transactional risk. In the next section we will propose a method­
ology by which the risk assessing agent determines the level 
of transactional risk and makes an interaction-based decision on 
that. It is logical that while determining the level of transactional 
risk there is uncertainty in the risk assessing agent's mind, as it is 
being determined in an interaction that is going to be held at a fu­
ture period of time, in which nothing is certain. This uncertainty 
can be classified into two types: 'ambiguity' and 'vagueness'. 
We define ambiguity as that type of uncertainty which repre­
sents its inability to identify the concrete levells or magnitudes 
of transactional risk in the interaction, whereas vagueness is de­
~ned.~s that type of uncertainty which represents its inability to 
IdentIfy the degree or likelihood to which those levels will occur 
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X-Axis shows the different levels of failure in commiting to the expectallons 
Y-Axis shows the probability of occurrence 
Figure J The railurcLcvel Curve of the husiness interaction, 
pose that the risk assessing agent determines the magnitude of 
transactional risk in the interaction in a twofold process. The first 
part deals with ascertaining the numerical level of transactional 
risk and the second part deals with determining the linguistic 
level of transactional risk. 
4. 	 DETERMINING THE NUMERICAL 
LEVEL OF TRANSACTIONAL RISK 
While ascertaining the numerical level of transactional risk, we 
consider the possibility distribution of the input variables and nOI 
their probability distribution. Possibility distribution allows the 
risk assessing agent to capture the different levels of risk along 
with their accurate magnitudes of occurrence over a future pe­
riod of time. The risk assessing agent considers the effect of 
the FailureLevel Curve (FLC) of the risk assessed agent on the 
financial amounts that it has at stake to determine the Financial 
Risk in the business interaction. To avoid considering its etreet 
again we propose that while determining the Transactional Risk 
it takes into consideration only two if its constituents, namely the 
loss of investment probability and the possible consequences of 
failure from the determined subcategories. The numerical mao­
. 	 e 
nnude of transactional risk in the interaction by using possibility 
theory is determined mathematically by a relation between: 
Transactional Risk = Possible Consequences of Failure $ Loss 
of Investment Probability 
The operator '$' between the two inputs represents convolu­
tion. Universe of discourse (UoD) defines the scope or range to 
which the variable extends. The UoD of the input variables and 
the output variable is defined by the following sets: 
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o 2.500 5,000 7.500 10.000 12.500 15.000 17,500 
X-Axis represents the required financial amounts to be kept at stake 
Y-Axis represents the probability of those resources to be kept at stake 
Figure 2 The Actual Factual Amount Invested Curve of the Interaction. 
Possible Consequences of Failure (PCF) 
={O, 1,2,3.......... (00) whereeachelementhasaunilof%. 

Loss of Investment Probability (LOIP) 
(0, 1,2,3 ............. 100) where each elemcnt has a unit of %. 

Transactional Risk (TR) 
= (0, 1,2,3............ JOO) where each element has a unit of %. 

To obtain the possibility distribution of an input variable. the 
likelihood of occurrence of each element from its universe of 
discourse should be determined. This likelihood of occurrence 
of an element is tcrmed the 'degree of evidence' of its outcome, 
represented by 'm (A)" where 'A' is an event or element from 
the universe of discourse of the input variable 'X'. From the 
universe of discourse, those elements with degree of evidence 
greater than zero are called the 'focal elements' for the particular 
input variable. These elements represent the sets from the UoD 
for that variable upon which the evidence of occurrence focuses 
and which furthermore will be utilized from that input variable to 
determine the magnitude of transactional risk in the interaction. 
The degree of evidence of an element from the UoD should be in 
the interval between [0, I] and the cumulative sum of the degree 
of evidence of all the focal elements from the UoD should be 
equal to I. From that the possibility of occurrence of an element 
'A i' of the input variable X can be determined from the focal 
elements of its UoD by [21, 22]: 
/I 
7T(Ai) = Lm(Aj) (I) 
)=1 
where: m(Aj) represents the degree of evidence of 'Aj' from 
the focal elements of the input variable from its UoD, and which 
have been ordered such that i < j and 7T (A i) 2: 7C (A i)' 
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Once the focal elements of the input variables (PCF and LOIP) 
along with their degree of evidence from their UoD have been 
determined, they must then be convolved to determine the trans­
actional risk in the interaction. The focal elements of the output 
variable function from its defined universe of discourse are de­
termined in the convolution process. The convolution of the 
possibility distributions is the artesian product of the input vari­
ables [23]. The convolution of the focal elements from the input 
UoD (X and Y) is done by taking their artesian products and is 
represented by: 
PCF ffi LOIP {<x. y> : where x E PCF and Y E LOIPJ 
(2) 
where: <x, y> denotes the tuple which represents the artesian 
product of the input focal elements from their UoD. 
The possibility distribution of the focal elements of the resul­
tant output variable as the result of the convolution of the inputs 
variables is represented by [23]: 
7T(U) max{min[7TPCF(x).7TLOIP(V)]) (3) 
where: u is the focal element of the output function determined 
as the artesian product of the inputs f(x. y). 
7T(U) is the possibility of focal element 'u' from the output 
universe of discourse. 
The above equation gives the possibility of occurrence of the 
focal elements of the magnitude of transactional risk in the inter­
action due to the convolution of the focal elements of the inputs, 
the possible consequences of failure and the loss of investment 
probability. 
To explain with an example the process of determining the 
level of transactional risk in an interaction. let us consider that a 
risk assessing agent 'A' wants to interact with a logistics company 
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to transfer its goods from Penh to Melhourne. There are various 
possihle logistics companies for it to choose from; and agent 'A' 
to make an informed <.Iecision hased on the level of transactional 
risk present in interaction with each of them. Let us consi<.ler that 
agent 'N accor<.ling to its expectations an<.l maximum investment 
capacity 01'$ 13.000 determines the level of performance risk and 
financial risk in forming an interaction with agent '8' as shown 
in Figure I and 2 respectively. From that it has to determine 
the level of transactional risk in its interaction with the logistics 
company 'B'. To determine the focal elements an<.lthe possihility 
<.Iistribution of the PCF in the interaction, the risk assessing agent 
from its maximum investment capacity should determine the 
levels of extra financial resources that it has to keep at stake 
while interacting with the risk assessed agent. The steps to be 
followe<.l arc: 
• 	 It shoul<.l determine the probability mass function (PMF) of 
the Ar'AIC in interacting with the risk assessed agent. The 
PMF oftheAFAIC shows the probability of an amount that 
the risk assessing agent has to keep at stake throughout the 
<.Iuration of interacting with the risk assesse<.l agent. 
• 	 It should then determine the point on the PMF of the AFAIC 
which represents its maximum investment capacity in the 
interaction, which is terme<.l as 'x'. 
• 	 From point 'x', the risk assessing agent on a scale of 0-1 00 
shoul<.l determine the degrees of extra financial resources 
that it has to keep at stake or the levels of its un-serve<.l 
investment in the interaction. 
• 	 From the UoO for the PCF, the focal clements shoul<.l be 
chosen accor<.ling to the measure of step size on the AFAlC 
of the levels of un-serve<.l investment in the interaction. 
• 	 The risk assessing agent shoul<.l then <.Ietermine the <.Iegree 
of evidence (m (A» of each focal clement. which repre­
sents the level of un-served investment in the interaction. 
This is determined by taking into consideration the PMF or 
the particular financial amount from the AFAIC and then 
converting it to possibility <.Iistribution. 
• 	 Based on the degree of evidence calculate<.l for each focal 
element from the UoO, the possibility distrihution of the 
PCF can he determined by using equation I. 
• 	 The LOIP of the interaction in contrast to the PCF is a single 
crisp value in the range of [0-1], which shows the ordinate 
on the AFAIC at the end of its maximum investment capac­
ity in the interaction. But in or<.ler to utilize a unilie<.l and 
comparable numerical scale to the two inputs, the range of 
the LOIP is normalized in the range between 0-100. 
• 	 Hence. the ordinate of the AFAIC at point 'x' is taken as 
the focal clement from its UoO to represent the LOIP in the 
interaction. The degree of evi<.lence of the rocal clement is 
taken as I. 
Once the focal elements an <.I their <.Iegree of evi<.lence for each 
input variahle have heen determine<.l, the risk assessing agent 
should then convolve them to determine the focal clements of 
transactional risk in the interaction from its UnO by using equa­
tion 2. The possibility of occurrence of the focal clements of 
transactional risk in the interaction can then be <.Ietermined by us­
ing equation 3. In the current example, the level of transactional 
risk 10 the risk assessing agent 'A' in forming an interaction with 
the risk assessed agent '8' is as shown in Figure 3. The resul­
tant graph will give the risk assessing agent with <.Iifferent levels 
of transactional risk along with the possibility of occurrence of 
those levels. 
5. 	 DETERMINING THE LINGUISTIC 
LEVEL OF TRANSACTIONAL RISK 
Our motive I()r incorporating the fuzzy inference system is fort he 
risk assessing agent to ascertain semantically the level oftransac­
tional risk in interacting with a risk assessed agent. Fuzzy infer­
ence systems arc mathematical ohjects mo<.leting the vagueness 
present in the natural language when the <.Iescribed phenomena 
<.10 not have sharply deline<.l houn<.laries. They were <.Ievelopcd 
to incorporate the concept of partial truth characterized by the 
fuzziness of the <.lata which yiel<.ls a more accurate mathematical 
representation of the perception of truth than that of crisp sets 
[241. 
A fuzzy inference system models the vague inputs in terms of se­
mantics an<.l transforms them into a mathematical representation 
of the <.lata to map its output semantics. To achieve this, <.lata is 
transforme<.l from crisp values to fuzzy sets by using the <.Ielined 
pre<.licates. A fuzzy set or predicate is a linguistic phrase that is 
use<.l as a semantic label for representing a part of the variahh.:. 
which best matches its <.Iescription. The pre<.licates for a variable 
shoul<.l be dcline<.l such that they cover the whole universe of 
<.Iiscourse or the scope in whieh the variable exten<.ls. Once the 
predicates have oeen <.Iclined for a variahle, then the member­
ship function for each of the pre<.licates in that variable should 
he deline<.l so that they cover its scope or its range of universe or 
discourse. The membership function is used to transform each 
crisp input into a fuzzy variable. hy utilizing the pre<.licates and 
then <.Ietermining the <.Iegree of qualification or the membership 
value of the crisp input to those predicates. As mentioned pre­
viously. the universe of <.Iiscourse (UoO) for the inputs PCF and 
LOIP an<.l output TR ranges from (O, L 2 ... ., 1(0) where each 
clement has a unit of%. To classify <.Iiflcrent fuzzy sets for each 
variable, we <.Iivi<.le the universe of <.Iiscourse such that there arc 
6 pre<.licates in each of them. Those pre<.licates arc: 'Extremely 
Low'. 'Low' 'Low Me<.lium', 'Me<.lium High', 'High' an<.l 'Ex­
tremely High'. The range of a predicate varies for each variahle 
accor<.ling to the severity of the value in its context. The member­
ship function for each variable is represented hy the trapezoidal 
curve such that its shape is as shown in Figure 4-6. 
To transform a focal element 'x' of an input linguistic variahle 
to the <.Ietine<.l fuzzy sets in it, the risk assessing agent has to 
<.Ietermine the possibility to which that clement 'x' corresponds 
with the detine<.l pre<.licates of that input variable. This is <.lone 
oy consi<.lering the overlap hetween the <.Iegree of evidence of 
the input value 'x'. with the degree of membership to which 'x' 
~'(JITcsponds to a particular predicate. The possibility that the 
fULlY set or pre<.licate 'A' of an input variable will occllr basctl 
on the <.Iegree of evi<.lence of input 'x' is given oy [24]: 
n(A) max{min[n(x), OOMA(x)ll· 
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X-Axis represents the levels of transactional risk 
Y-Axis represents the likelihood of occurence 
Figure -' The Numerical Level of Transactional Risk in an Interaction. 
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X-Axis represents the magnitude ofTransactional Risk 
Y-Axis represents the degree of membership 
I'igure 7 The Linguistic Level of Transactional Risk in an Interaction. 
Equation 4 is repeated for each focal element 'x' or an input 
variable to determine the possibility of occurrence of a fuzzy 
set or predicate in its UoD. Once all the focal elements of the 
inputs have been transformed to their corresponding fuzzy sets, 
they must then be processed in the inference engine of the fuzzy 
system which consists of fuzzy rules to draw a conclusion on the 
UoD of the output linguistic variable. The rules which we use in 
our model are ofthe IF-THEN structure. The left hand side of the 
rule is called the conditional part and the right hand side is called 
as the implication part of the rule. The implication part of the rule 
gives the level of transactional risk in the interaction based on 
the computations performed by the inference engine, according 
to the inputs given to it. We utilize the logic AND operator 
to consider the intersection between the input fuzzy sets, while 
implicating the magnitude of risk present in the interaction by 
utilizing the input fuzzy sets. In our fuzzy inference model, there 
are two inputs (peF and LOIP) which are further defined by 6 
predicates. Hence, the total number of homogenous rules in our 
system will be: 6 x 6 = 36. The rules of our fuzzy inference 
model to ascertain the linguistic level of transactional risk are as 
shown in Table I. 
The output of the fuzzy inference system will be determined 
by the degree or strength to which each rule fires. The rules 
usc the possibility of the fuzzy set of each input as the weight-
computer systems science & engineering 22 
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• 	 Risk Taking (RT): 'Risk Taking' is delined as that attitude 
of the risk assessing agent where it is indifferent to any 
level of transactional risk and is ready to interact with a risk 
assessing agent, no matter what level of transactional risk 
is present in the interaction. 
These broad I.:ategories cover the different ranges whil.:h repre­
sents the risk assessing agent's attitude while decision-making. 
In terms of accepting the levels of transactional risk the risk atti· 
tudes of the risk assessing agent is in the order of, RA < RN < 
RT. It is possible that the risk propensity level of the risk assess­
ing agent might not always be a crisp value which corresponds 
totally to a given level, but might overlap across the different 
possible levels. To take such scenarios into account, we pro­
pose using a fuzzy inference system to (a) capture the fuzziness 
of the risk attitude of the risk assessing agent and (b) ascer­
tain its impact on the level of transactional risk and recommend 
its decision. The operation of the fuzzy recommender system 
in making this decision can be classified and divided into two 
parts, the learning part and the computation part. In the learn­
ing part, the recommender system 'learns' about the tendency of 
the risk assessing agent in taking risk in the interaction, and in 
the computation pari, it utilizes the determined tendency of the 
risk assessing agent in computing the recommended risk-based 
decision in forming an interaction with the risk assessed agenlls. 
Fuzzy Inference Model for Recommending a Risk-based De­
cision 
To capture the fuzziness in the risk propensity of the risk assess­
ing agent. we define the universe of discourse (UoD) for that 
variable in the range of 1-5; ( I, 2, 3,4, 5) where each clement 
represents a numeric value and is unit-less. To classify different 
fuzzy sets for the input variable 'Risk Propensity' of the risk 
assessing agent we divide the universe of discourse into 3 predi­
cates, 'Risk Averse', 'Risk Neutral' and 'Risk Taking' as shown 
in Figure 8. We aim to determine the accurate risk propensity of 
the risk assessing agent against a set of psychological questions, 
whose results are then quantified between the range of 1-5. We 
do not discuss those set of questions in this paper. 
The second input of the fuzzy inference system is the Level 
of Transactional risk as shown in Figure 6. 
The fuzzy inference system based on the inputs given to it 
computes an output specifying the Recommended Risk-based 
Decision (RRD). We consider a range of 0-10; {O, I, 2, ..., 10} 
as the universe of discourse (UoD) while determining the recom­
mended risk-based decision output. As our aim is to develop a 
fuzzy inference system which assists the risk assessing agent in 
deciding on an interaction with a risk assessed agent, the fuzzy 
sets for the output variable are defined such that there are two 
predicates in them. They are 'Proceed' (P) and 'Don't Proceed' 
(DP) which represents the two possibilities for the risk assessing 
agent to consider while decision making in an interaction. So 
the membership function for the output 'Recommended Risk­
based Decision in the Interaction' is defined as an intersection of 
straight lines spread over the universe of discourse for the fuzzy 
variable, as shown in Figure 9. 
Once the input variables have been transformed into fuzzy 
sets by using their defined membership function, they must then 
be processed in the inference engine to determine the impact of 
the risk propensity of the risk assessing agent on the transac­
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tional risk in interacting with the risk assessed agent. In the next 
sub-section. we define the rules for the fuzzy inference system. 
which recommends a decision output to the risk assessing agent 
in forming an interaction with a risk assessed agent. 
Defining the Rules for Fuzzy Risk-based Decision Recom­
mender Model 
As mentioned earlier, with the change in the risk propensity levels 
the way how the risk assessing agent perceives the transactional 
risk in an interaction varies. To clarify with an example. a risk 
assessing agent having a risk propensity nature of Risk Averse 
(RA) = I, will analyze the risk in interacting with a risk assessed 
agent to be acceptable ornot in adifferent way, as compared to the 
same risk assessing agent if its risk propensity nature might have 
been a combination of Risk Averse (RA) and Risk Neutral (RN) 
levels. To take into consideration the intermediate values of the 
risk assessing agent's risk propensity on the level of transactional 
risk in the interaction, in Table 2 we deline by using fuzzy rules 
the acceptable levels of transactional risk by the risk assessing 
agent in interacting with a risk assessed agent, according to the 
various levels of its risk propensity. Furthermore, while defining 
the fuzzy rules. if the risk assessing agent's risk propensity is a 
combination of different aUitudes, then we consider the maxi· 
mum risk attitude (MRA) of the risk assessing agent and based 
on that determine the maximum level of acceptable transactional 
risk (MARL) in the interaction. As mentioned earlier, the na­
ture of the risk taking attitude of the risk assessing agent in the 
interaction is in the order of: RA < RN < RT. Hence. if a risk 
assessing agent's risk propensity nature is a combination oflevcls 
RA and RN with DOM 0.4 and 0.6 respectively, then the maxi­
mum risk attitude or risk propensity nature of the risk assessing 
agent is RN = 0.6. Based on this risk propensity level by using 
fuzzy rules, the recommender system should determine the max· 
imum level of transactional risk which it can term as acceptable. 
It is highly possible that there is more than one fuzzy sct or 
predicate of transactional risk present in interacting with a risk 
assessed agent. For example, let us consider that a risk assessing 
agent 'N determines the level of transactional risk in interacting 
with agent 'B' as a combination of three predicates: MH I, 
H = 0.1818 and EH 0.0909. In order for determining on 
an interaction. the recommender system should consider each 
predicate of transactional risk and then analyze whether or not 
it is acceptable to the risk assessing agent according to its risk 
attitude or risk propensity in the interaction. Three possibilities 
arise here according to the risk propensity nature of the risk 
assessing agent 'N: 
• 	 the levels of transactional risk in the interaction are totally 
acceptable to the risk assessing agent: 
• 	 the levels of transactional risk in the interaction arc totally 
unacceptable to the risk assessing agent: 
• 	 the level/s of transactional risk in the interaction islare par­
tially acceptable to the risk assessing agent. 
For example. if we consider a risk assessing agent's 'A' risk 
propensity nature to be as RT = I. then from Table 2 the MARL 
according to its risk propensity is EH = I. Based on that. the de­
termined levels of transactional risk in interacting with agent'S' 
(MH I. H 0.1818, and EH = 0.0909) arc totally acceptahle 
































































to the risk assessing agent. Similarly, if the risk propensity of the 
risk assessing agent is RA = I, then all the levels of transactional 
risk in the interaction with agent 'B' are beyond its maximum 
acceptable leveL When the risk assessing agent's risk propensity 
is RN = 0.6 and RT = 0.4, then it partially accepts the level of 
transactional risk in the interaction with agent 'B'. In each case, 
the recommended output (RRD) from the fuzzy recommender 
system to the risk assessing agent varies according to the level 
of its acceptance of the transactional risk in the interaction. 
In order for the fuzzy recommender system to consider such 
cases, we introduce a variable called 'Possible to Proceed in the 
Interaction at this stage' (Poss). A binary value of either I or 
ois assigned to this variable for each predicate of transactional 
risk. The assigned value depends on whether that predicate of 
transactional risk (CRL) along with its magnitude or occurrence 
(DOM) is acceptable to the risk assessing agent or not. accord­
ing to its current risk propensity (CRA). A value of I affirms 
the above condition whereas the value of 0 suggests otherwise. 
The output of the Poss variable applies only to that predicate of 
transactional risk. If there are more than one predicate of trans~ 
actional risk, then the recommender system for each of them 
should determine the value for the variable Poss according to 
each predicate of its risk propensity. The risk propensity of the 
risk m;sessing agent is represented by three fuzzy sets as shown 
in Figure 8, and the transactional risk in the interaction is rep­
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resented by six fuzzy sets as shown in Figure 6. Hence, the 
total number of homogeneous rules to be defined for the fuzzy 
inference system to assist in decision making is: 6 x 3 = 18. 
as shown in Table 3. The rules that we use to define the fuzzy 
model are of the IF-THEN-ELSE structure. The two inputs to 
the fuzzy system which form the LHS of the rules are combined 
together with the logic 'AND' operator for the inference part to 
give the RHS of the rule; which is accepted if the 'Poss' value is 
true, otherwise the 'ELSE' operator is considered. 
The fuzzy system determines the value for the variable 'Poss' 
in Table 4 for each of the 'CRL' being considered, by taking into 
consideration the 'MRA' of the risk assessing agent and then 
comparing if the 'CRL' is less than or equal to the 'MARL', If 
this is the case, then the value of 'Poss' in Table 3 at that 'CRL' 
will be I otherwise it will be O. 
Once the fuzzy rules of Table 3 have been evaluated, then 
they must be aggregated and defuzzified in order to obtain a 
crisp value on the output membership function. For aggregating 
the output of the rules we utilize the Root Sum Square (RSS) 
method. The RSS method determines the square of each rule 
output which corresponds to a predicate in the output member­
ship function and then sums them up to tlnd its centroid. In our 
case, as there are two predicates in the output membership func­
tion, the aggregation output of all the rules for each predicate is 
determined by: 
25 
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llilble 2 Defining the fuzzy rules to delermine the maximum acceptable level of Table 4 Determining the value for Ihe variable 'Poss' 
transactional risk according to the risk propensity of the risk assessing agent. 
MRA CRL Poss Poss 
MRA MARL 
If RA = I And EL= I then else 0 
If RA = I then EL= I If RN 0.1 And L 0.2 then else 0 
If RN = 0.1 then L=0.2 If RN 0.2 And L 0.4 then else 0 
If RN 0.2 then L 0.4 If RN 0.3 And L=0.6 then else 0 
If RN 0.3 then L 0.6 If RN = 0.4 And L =0.8 then else 0 
If RN = 0.4 then L =0.8 If RN = 0.5 And L = I then else o 
If RN = 0.5 then L=I If RN = 0.6 And LM = 0.2 then else o 
If RN = 0.6 then LM =0.2 If RN 0.7 And LM 0.4 then else o 
If RN = 0.7 then LM 0.4 If RN 0.8 And LM 0.6 then else o 
If RN 0.8 then LM 0.6 If RN 0.9 And LM = 0.8 then else o 
If RN = 0.9 then LM 0.8 If RN = I And LM = I then else o 
If RN = I then LM= I If RT = 0.1 And MH = 0.34 then else o 
If RT = 0.1 then MH = 0.34 If RT = 0.2 And MH::::: 0.67 then else o 
If RT = 0.2 then MH =0.67 If RT 0.3 And MH then else o 
If RT = 0.3 then MH= I If RT 0.4 And H 0.34 then else o 
If RT 0.4 then H 0.34 If RT 0.5 And H = 0.67 then else o 
If RT 0.5 then H = 0.67 If RT 0.6 And H I then else o 
If RT = 0.6 then H If RT = 0.7 And EH = 0.34 then else o 
If RT = 0.7 then EH 0.34 If RT = 0.8 And EH = 0.67 then else o 
If RT = 0.8 then EH = 0.67 If RT = 0.9 And EH 0.99 then else o 
If RT = 0.9 then EH = 0.99 If RT::::: I And EH = I then else o 
If RT then EH= I 
...... ---------­
utilizing the centre of gravity or centroid method gives the scalar 
Table 3 Defining the rules for the fuzzy recolllillended risk-based decision output of the fuzzy inference system. This value when plotted 
model. on the output fuzzy set represents the recommended risk-based 
decision from the fuzzy inference model to the risk assessing 
CRL CRA RRD Poss RRD agent. In the current interaction scenario, if the risk assessing 
agent 'A' determines its risk propensity value as 2.4, then theIf EL And RA then P if else DP 
quantified fuzzy sets of its risk propensity are RA 0.3 andIf LAnd RA then P if else DP 
RN = 0.7. Based on that, the range of output by the fuzzy If LM And RA then P if else DP 
system is shown in Figure 10. The centroid of the range is 93;If MH And RA then P if else DP 
which qualifies to the fuzzy sets Proceed and Don't ProceedIf HAnd RA then P if else DP 
with strength of 93.114% and 6.886% respectively. This output If EH And RA then P if else DP 
shows that not all levels of transactional risk present in forming If EL And RN then P if else DP 
an interaction with agent 'B' are acceptable to agent 'A' andIf LAnd RN then P if else DP 
there arc some levels which are beyond its acceptable level of If LM And RN then P if else DP 
transactional risk. If MH And RN then P if else DP 
If there is more than one agent from whom agent 'A' has toIf HAnd RN then P if else DP 
determine on an interaction, then by utilizing the proposed ap­If EH And RN then P if else DP 
proach it can ascerlain the different levells of transactional riskIf EL And RT then P if else DP 
in forming an interaction with them and then utilize their risk at­If LAnd RT then P if else DP 
titude to determine on an interaction with them. Based on such If LM And RT then P if else DP 
analysis it can make an informed decision of its future course of If MH And RT then P if else DP 
interaction with a risk assessed agent. It is quite possible thatIf HAnd RT then P if else DP 
none or some of the risk assessed agents might not come with theIf EH And RT then P if else DP 
100% Proceed value. In such cases, the determined analysis will 
help the risk assessing agent to ascertain the magnitude to which 
the determined level of transactional risk is unacceptable to it 
11 'Proceed' = ~2 and then carry out the process of risk management accordingly. 
This is our future work. 
Il 'Don't Proceed' /L (DP)2. 
7. CONCLUSION 
The detennined values for each predicate from the aggregation 
process are (hen plotted on the output memhership function, to Risk is an important factor for the interaction initiating agent 
ascerlain the range of the output. Defuzzifying the range by to consider while decision making in e-business interaction. By 
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analyzing the level of risk in an e-business interaction, the initiat­
ing agent can ascertain the level of failure and financial loss that 
lIar 
it can experience in its business activity. Such an analysis cannot 
ted be determined by the assessment of either trust or security in this 
sed 
domain. In this paper, we extended our previous work and pro­
ing 
posed a methodology by which the interaction initiating agent
ing 
determines the numerical and linguistic level of transactional 
the 
risk in forming an interaction with the other user. Our proposed
a.nd 
approach utilizes possibility theory and fuzzy inference system 
zzy 
to determine the different numeric and linguistic levels of trans­
U; 
actional risk respectively in an interaction. This will help the 
eed 
interaction initiating agent to alleviate the ambiguity and vague­
:put 
ness that is present in its mind before decision-making. We then 
ling 
proposed a fuzzy inference system that captures the risk propen­
and 
sity or risk aUitude of the interaction initiating agent and then 
lof 
quantifies its effect on the determined linguistic level of transac­
tional risk. By utilizing the determined analysis, it can make an 
S to 
informed interaction-based decision which in turn would help
ap­
it to maximize its interaction experience and expected benefits. 
risk 
Our future work is to consider the determined un-acceptable lev­
c at­
elsoftransactional risk in the business activity and then propose
oUch 
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